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Abstract
As healthcare in many countries faces an aging popu-
lation and rising costs, mobile Health (mHealth) sensing
technologies promise a new opportunity. However, the
privacy concerns associated with mHealth sensing are a
limiting factor for their widespread adoption. The use of
wireless body area networks pose a particular challenge.
Although there exist protocols that provide a secure and
private communication channel between two devices,
the large transmission overhead associated with these
protocols limit their application to low-power mHealth
sensing devices. We propose an adaptive security model
that enables use of privacy-preserving protocols in low-
power mHealth sensing by reducing the network over-
head in the transmissions, while maintaining the security
and privacy properties provided by the protocols.
1 Introduction
Recent improvements in mobile computing and de-
velopments in miniature medical sensors have enabled
mobile Health (mHealth) sensing. An mHealth sensing
system can deliver continuous health monitoring to pa-
tients throughout their daily activities with the potential
to simultaneously reduce cost and improve the quality of
healthcare [6, for example]. However, there are strong
privacy and security concerns associated with mHealth
sensing. For instance, a woman wearing a wireless fetal
heart monitor, during her daily activities, may not want
people around her knowing that she has such a device or
observing the data transmitted by the device. In a wire-
less network, an adversary can observe a device’s trans-
missions and may learn the contents of the transmissions
or the type of the device [5, 9]. Thus, mHealth sensing
requires protocols that provide strong privacy and secu-
rity guarantees.
There exist some privacy-preserving protocols that
provide security and privacy properties like unlinkabil-
ity, data confidentiality, data integrity and data authenti-
cation; most such protocols are designed for Wi-Fi be-
cause the privacy problem is well known in the Wi-Fi
setting. These protocols, however, add various forms
of overhead; although the overhead may not be signif-
icant in a Wi-Fi setting where the payloads are large, in
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an mHealth sensing network, the payloads are small and
this overhead becomes significant.
Often the protocol overhead is related to the secu-
rity of the protocol. For instance, the message authen-
tication code (MAC), which is sent with the packet for
data authentication, contributes to the packet overhead.
The MAC length determines the strength of the proto-
col against message authentication attacks; for example,
broadly speaking, to forge a packet with a 128-bit MAC,
by brute-force, the adversary would have to try about
2128 times,1 but to forge a packet with a 16-bit MAC,
the adversary would only have to try about 216 times,
which is not sufficient protection. Thus, simple ways to
reduce the overhead would also reduce the security of
the protocol.
We propose an adaptive security model in which
nodes change the size of packet overhead dynamically
when a node detects a possible forgery attack, thereby
providing strong security and privacy in the presence of
an adversary, but otherwise using low overhead to mini-
mize the energy consumption of the network.
2 Privacy-preserving protocols
Due to the broadcast nature of wireless networks,
there are many ways in which a user’s privacy is leaked;
for example, an adversary can infer some information
about the data being transmitted, or the device trans-
mitting the data, based on the address in the transmit-
ted packet, other identifying information in the packet,
the size of the packet, or the timing of the packet se-
quence. Thus, the goal of a privacy-preserving protocol
is to obfuscate such information so that the adversary
cannot infer any sensitive information about the data or
about the device transmitting the data. There are several
privacy-preserving protocols for wireless networks pro-
posed in the literature [1, 8, and their references]. Such
protocols provide several properties: data confidential-
ity (an adversary should not be able to learn the contents
of the underlying data in the packet), data authenticity
(an adversary should not be able to forge a packet with-
out being detected), data integrity (an adversary should
1More precisely, to forge a n-bit MAC the adversary would
have to try about 2n−1 times (on average); for simplicity we









Figure 1. a) Generalized packet format of a privacy-
preserving protocol, b) Adaptive packet format
not be able to modify a packet without being detected),
and unlinkability (given two packets transmitted to/from
the same node, the adversary should not be able to link
the packets).
Figure 1a shows a generalized packet format of a
typical privacy-preserving protocol. Standard encryp-
tion techniques provide confidentiality and authenticity
by encrypting the payload and appending a message au-
thentication code (MAC). To achieve unlinkability, the
privacy-preserving protocols ensure that the header H ,
the payload, and the MAC M change with each packet
such that the entire packet appears as a pseudorandom
string to an adversary. The receiver, however, is able to
identify packets addressed to itself efficiently based on
H . We assume that the privacy-preserving protocols use
strong cryptographic algorithms to compute H and M ,
and the only way for the adversary to forge H and M is
by a brute-force attack.
The packet overhead (H and M ) of existing proto-
cols is usually high (e.g., SlyFi [1] overhead is 32 bytes).
This overhead is not significant in a Wi-Fi setting, where
payloads are large (e.g., 512 bytes). But for mHealth
sensing, where the sensor data is small (1-50 bytes), 32
bytes of overhead is significant.
3 Adaptive security
In privacy-preserving protocols the receiver node
uses the header H to filter incoming packets (that is, to
determine whether the incoming packet is addressed to
this node), and it uses the MAC M for data authentica-
tion. This overhead (H and M ) in the protocols is usu-
ally fixed, and for strong security, the protocols choose
long H and long M . However, a node is not always in a
hostile environment, so using large overhead all the time
is inefficient. In most mobile devices, the network inter-
face is the most energy-consuming part of the system, so
we need to reduce network overhead.
In adaptive security, the parameter that we change is
the size of the header and the MAC sent in the packet.
Thus, instead of using a fixed large overhead, the nodes
use a small packet overhead that expands dynamically
if the node detects the presence of an adversary who is
trying to forge a packet.2 This approach provides strong
2As described below, our method conservatively reacts
security when required (e.g., when there is an attack),
but saves energy, at both the sender node and the receiver
node, when not required.
3.1 Adapting: how
In a typical body-area sensor network for mHealth
sensing, there will be one mobile node (MN, e.g., mobile
phone), and one or more sensor nodes (SNs). Let us
consider, for simplicity, a network with one MN and one
SN.
We propose to shorten the packet header and MAC.
As shown in Figure 1b, the actual bits sent as header
and as MAC are the l most significant bits of H and M ,
respectively. In our proposal, this length adapts to poten-
tial forgery attacks; thus, the MN and SN need to agree
on l and how it changes. Let σMN and σSN be the sets of
values that MN and SN use, respectively, to determine
the header and the MAC lengths for an incoming or an
outgoing packet; for example, if σMN = {l0}, then for ev-
ery received packet, the MN will assume the header and
MAC lengths as l0. If set σMN contains more than one
element, then MN will parse the packet multiple times,
each time with a different value from σMN, till either the
packet is accepted (after header and MAC verification)
or the packet is discarded. Thus, if the SN sends a packet
p with header and MAC of size l each, then the MN will
accept the packet only if l ∈ σMN. In our adaptive pro-
tocol, the size of set σSN is always one; thus, the SN can
communicate with the MN only if σSN ⊆ σMN.
Figure 2 shows how the MN and the SN change the
sets σmn and σsn so that they can communicate with
each other while adapting to the new header and new
MAC length l. At time t0, during discovery, the MN
and the SN share the initial length l0; that is, at time t0,
σMN = σSN = {l0}. In our proposal, only the MN makes
the decision to change l. Later at some time t1, the MN
decides that it needs to adapt and change the header and
MAC length to l1, and so it adds l1 to σMN. After time
t1, when the MN receives a packet from the SN (the
header and MAC size for this packet will be l0), it ac-
cepts the packet (because l0 ∈ σMN), and piggybacked
on the ACK returned to the SN, it indicates its prefer-
ence for l1, so SN adds l1 to σSN and removes the old
value (l0) from σSN. However, the SN may not receive
the ACK (as shown in the figure), in which case the SN
will continue to send packets with header and MAC of
size l0 (each), which is okay because the MN can accept
those packets, as l0 ∈ σMN. Eventually, at time t2, the SN
will receive the ACK, and it will change σSN (as shown
in the figure). Now, after time t2, when the MN receives
a packet from the SN (at time t3), it would know that the
SN has updated its σSN, and so the MN will remove the
old value l0 from σMN. Thus, in short, while adapting
to the new header and MAC size, the MN maintains the
set σMN such that σSN will always be its subset, and this
whenever header-collision counts rise too large, which may
simply indicate the presence of a neighboring network; in the




















σMN = {l0, l1}
Figure 2. Adaptive security model
ensures that the MN and the SN remain in sync and can
communicate while adapting.
3.2 Adapting: when
In this section we describe one simple condition that
triggers the MN to adapt. One can add more conditions
as per the application and network requirement. Due to
space constraints, we will provide only the intuition be-
hind the proof for choosing this specific condition.
Smaller header and smaller MAC decrease the work
required to forge a packet. So the MN increases the
header and the MAC length in presence of an adversary
who is trying to forge a packet, thereby making it harder
for the adversary to succeed in forging a packet.
The MN uses the header to filter incoming messages,
so depending on the network traffic (due to transmis-
sions from neighboring BASNs), a smaller header will
cause more collisions in the MN’s hash table than a
larger header. A hit in the hash table implies that the
incoming message is from the SN, or that the message
is of a neighboring BASN that happens to use a header
matching one of the headers in the MN’s hash table, or
that the message is a forgery attempt. It is hard for the
MN to distinguish between the latter two cases, in which
MAC verification fails. We take a cautious approach,
and consider a failed MAC verification to be a forgery
attempt, and hence presence of an adversary.
The MN’s hash table contains w headers. For pack-
ets with header and MAC lengths l, the adversary has
to transmit about 22l/w times to successfully forge a
packet. The MN counts the number of forgery attempts,
and when the number of the such forgery attempts gets
larger than a threshold α (we derive α in Section 4), the
MN increases the header and MAC lengths, which in
turn increases the difficulty of forgery. Thus, the security
against forgery increases as the adversary works harder.
The MN resets the forgery counter, and the header and
MAC size to l0 after certain time T , which is determined
by the MN.
4 Security and privacy analysis
After adapting a privacy-preserving protocol, it is im-
portant that we preserve the security and privacy proper-
ties achieved by that protocol. As described above, the
properties achieved by a typical privacy-preserving pro-
tocol are unlinkability, data confidentiality, data authen-
ticity and data integrity. Data authentication is a stronger
property than data integrity; by achieving data authenti-
cation one also achieves data integrity.
Unlinkability. In a privacy-preserving protocol, the
H , payload, and M portions of a packet are pseudo-
random strings (from an adversary’s perspective), and
they change with each packet. This property provides
unlinkability — preventing packets from being linked
to a sender, a receiver, or even to each other. In the
adaptive security model we use a truncated H as the
header and a truncated M as the MAC. It is easy to prove
that any substring of an unlinkable string is also unlink-
able (because if a substring is linkable, then it implies
that the adversary can link the full strings, by using just
the linkable substring). Thus, the smaller header and
smaller MAC used in the adaptive security model are
also pseudorandom strings from an adversary’s perspec-
tive; hence, the packets in the adaptive security model
are also unlinkable.
Data confidentiality. The payload is not dependent
on the number of header or MAC bits transmitted as part
of the packet, and neither the size of the header or MAC
is dependent on the payload. Thus, in the adaptive secu-
rity model the header and the MAC do not give away any
more information about the payload than the full header
H and full MAC M used by the privacy-preserving pro-
tocol. Thus data confidentiality is preserved under the
adaptive security model.
Data authentication. In the adaptive security model
we wish to provide security against existential forgery
with a probability of 2−δ; that is, at any given time, the
probability that the adversary can forge a packet (where
the underlying message may or may not be meaningful
to the receiver) is never greater than 2−δ, where δ (> 0)
is set by the MN.
The header and the MAC are pseudorandom strings
from the adversary’s perspective, and to successfully
forge a packet, the adversary has to guess the right
header (among the w headers in MN’s hash table) and
the right MAC for the packet. Thus, if l represents the
header and MAC lengths, the probability that the adver-







We need the probability P to be lower than 2−δ. Thus,
solving the inequality P < 2−δ for x, we get the follow-





Whenever this inequality becomes invalid (that is, the







































Figure 3. Adaptive security against a forgery attack




) times), the MN
increases the header and MAC lengths (i.e., l) to main-
tain the inequality in Equation 2.
Figure 3 gives some intuition about how the MN will
adapt in the presence of an adversary who is trying to
forge a packet. The logarithmic x-axis represents the
work the adversary does to forge a packet (i.e., num-
ber of forgery attempts = 2x), and the y-axis represents
the bit-level security of the protocol, which is equivalent
to the size of header and MAC (i.e., 2l). The adversary
is likely to be successful in forging a packet if the line
representing the security of the protocol falls below the
forgery line (y= x). In the plot, the forgery probability is
set to 2−16 (i.e., δ = 16), and the initial l value is 16 bits
(i.e., l0 = 16). The plot also presents the security level
of a typical privacy-preserving protocol (PPP) that has
a overhead of 256 bits, and an equivalent security level.
Thus, as the adversary tries harder to forge the packet,
via brute-force attempts, the security increases, making
it harder for him to succeed. As you can see, in worse-
case scenario (i.e., when the adversary keeps trying or
there is continuous enough noise) the MN will choose
the highest header and MAC length. Thus, in worse-
case scenario, the adaptive protocol behaves similar to
the non-adaptive privacy-preserving protocol.
5 Related work
Our adaptive-security approach adapts the security
level of the protocol dynamically in response to network
activity that implies the presence of an adversary (or a
forgery attack). There are adaptive security models in
the literature but they differ in how the protocols adapt
and under what conditions they adapt.
Prasad et al. [3] suggest using three modes of secu-
rity: low-level, medium-level, and high-level security.
Depending on the user location (e.g., home vs. pub-
lic place) or which devices the user is contacting (e.g.,
trusted vs. untrusted), the model will choose an appro-
priate security level. The different levels of security
achieve different sets of properties, and they use dif-
ferent cipher algorithms. However, choosing the right
level of security is not easy; for example, a familiar loca-
tion (e.g., home) does not necessarily imply the absence
of an adversary. Portialla et al. [2] propose changing
ECC parameters to provide different levels of security
depending on the energy budget of the node. The TLS
cipher suite [4] is a real-world example where nodes can
negotiate and decide on the security level by selecting
algorithms (authentication, encryption, and message au-
thentication code). However, all these methods focus
on adapting cryptographic primitives (i.e., encryption,
MAC algorithms) to provide different levels of security
rather than on reducing network overhead, which would
provide more energy savings (especially in a wireless
network) then the proposed computational adaptation.
The hybrid security model proposed by Shon et al. [7]
is probably the closest work to our adaptive security
model. In their adaptive scheme they propose using
MAC of different sizes to provide different levels of se-
curity. In their scheme, they choose a security level
by the network characteristics (public, commercial, or
private) and the data characteristics (application data or
control data). Classifying data sensitivity and determin-
ing which level of security would be reasonable for a
given data type, while optimizing energy, can be tricky.
For mHealth sensing, where the medical data is consid-
ered sensitive, their approach would choose the higher-
level security, which would be energy inefficient. Our
adaptive model, however, adapts the security level dy-
namically in response to an attack by an adversary, and
in absence of an adversary it adapts to optimize the over-
head; thus, the application does not have to worry about
classifying data sensitivity or choosing a reasonable se-
curity level.
6 Conclusion
We demonstrate how to apply the adaptive security
model to a class of privacy-preserving protocols to re-
duce their transmission overhead while preserving the
security and privacy properties of those protocols, so that
these protocols can be used in low-power mHealth sen-
sors. A more complete presentation of the protocol, and
its evaluation will appear in a future paper.
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